Why are pension schemes frozen, and how does a freeze affect the employer’s risk?

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Zhao, Z. and Sutcliffe, C. orcid id iconORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0187-487X (2024) Why are pension schemes frozen, and how does a freeze affect the employer’s risk? International Review of Economics and Finance, 94. 103393. ISSN 1873-8036 doi: 10.1016/j.iref.2024.103393

Abstract/Summary

Defined benefit (DB) pension schemes involve substantial risks and costs for employers. So employers have frozen (or closed) their schemes. Using data on firms in the FTSE 100 index, we study the characteristics of employers who hard froze (no new members or accruals) their DB scheme, and the effect of this on the employer’s risk. We find that the probability of a hard freeze is a negative function of employer size, operating cash flow and unionization; and a positive function of a previous soft freeze (no new members). We also find that a hard freeze reduces total, unsystematic and credit risk; and increases systematic and asset risk.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/116844
Identification Number/DOI 10.1016/j.iref.2024.103393
Refereed Yes
Divisions Henley Business School > Finance and Accounting
Publisher Elsevier
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