A defence of conceptual analysis as a linguistic endeavour

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Grindrod, J. orcid id iconORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8684-974X (2023) A defence of conceptual analysis as a linguistic endeavour. Theoria, 89 (4). pp. 516-534. ISSN 1755-2567 doi: 10.1111/theo.12477

Abstract/Summary

In this paper, I outline and defend a traditional yet controversial view of conceptual analysis, particularly as it is used in epistemology. I will defend the view against a number of objections, all of which focus on the idea that conceptual analysis relies upon linguistic intuitions. Rather than trying to deny this claim, I will seek to vindicate the use of conceptual analysis within epistemology even given its reliance on linguistic intuitions. To do so, I first outline the view of conceptual analysis I have in mind and then respond to three broad objections from Quill Kukla (2015), Allan Hazlett (2018) and Stephen Stich (1988; 2009).

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/111927
Identification Number/DOI 10.1111/theo.12477
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell
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