Does balancing adequately capture the nature of rights?

Full text not archived in this repository.

Please see our End User Agreement.

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

Add to AnyAdd to TwitterAdd to FacebookAdd to LinkedinAdd to PinterestAdd to Email

Bilchitz, D. orcid id iconORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6195-675X (2010) Does balancing adequately capture the nature of rights? Southern African Public Law, 25 (2). pp. 423-444. ISSN 2219-6412

Abstract/Summary

Fifteen years into our constitutional democracy, it is accepted as a trite doctrine of Constitutional Law that fundamental rights are capable of limitation. Where the constitutionality of legislative or executive conduct is impugned, the Bill of Rights is commonly regarded as requiring a two-stage inquiry: first, has a right been violated in these circumstances? And secondly, if there has been a violation, can it be justified in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution, the general limitation clause? Whilst this is now a standard feature of South African Constitutional Law, the limitation of rights and the way it is conceived is of great significance and affects the very meaning of what it is to have a right in the South African Constitution.

Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/103074
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Law
Publisher UNISA
Download/View statistics View download statistics for this item

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Search Google Scholar